Introduction
The nonlinearity of a composite system or 'entity', whereby certain of its features (including associated powers and behaviours) cannot be seen as linear or other broadly additive combinations of features of the system's composing entities, has been often taken to be a telling mark of metaphysical emergence, coupling a composite system's dependence on an underlying system of composing entities, with the composite system's having some degree of ontological autonomy from this underlying system. But why think that nonlinearity is a mark of emergence, and moreover, of metaphysical rather than merely epistemological emergence? Are there diverse ways in which nonlinearity might enter into an account of properly metaphysical emergence? And what are the prospects for there actually being phenomena that are metaphysically emergent in any of these ways?
Here I will explore the mutual bearing of nonlinearity and metaphysical emergence, with an eye towards answering these and related questions. Given considerations of space I cannot hope to be comprehensive, but by focusing on a representative range of relevant accounts of emergence, and associated paradigm cases of nonlinearity, fairly robust results can, I think, be achieved.
I'll start, in Section , by considering how nonlinearity entered into the British Emergentist account of 'strong' metaphysical emergence, as involving the presence of new fundamental powers, forces/interactions, or laws; the emergence here is 'strong' in being of the sort that, were the base entities to be physical or physically acceptable, would falsify physicalism (or 'mechanism') were it to exist. 2 In particular, British Emergentists typically
It is additionally typically supposed that the ontological autonomy at issue will bring some degree of causal autonomy in its wake: epiphenomenalist views are not to the point here.
2 The question of how best to characterize the physical, hence physicalism, is controversial, but nothing in what follows will turn on the speci c characterization of the base entities at issue. Most commonly, the physical entities are taken to be those treated more or less directly by (ideal, or at least approximately accurate) fundamental physics; physically acceptable entities are entities that are supposed to be, one way or another 'nothing over and above' the physical entities-e.g. by being lower-level aggregates of physical particulars standing in physical relations, or by being weakly emergent from such aggregates, as the case may be (see Wilson ).
supposed that non-linearity of composite features and associated powers or behaviours was a su cient indication of strong metaphysical emergence of the features, hence systems, involved. As we'll see, this supposition (properly understood as involving a broad notion of additivity, involving not just intrinsic but also certain lower-level relational features of composing entities as 'summands') was plausible enough at the time. It was shown to be incorrect, however, by the discovery and creation of nonlinear complex systems (e.g. turbulent uids, populations reproducing under conditions of nite resources, the Game of Life) clearly failing to involve new fundamental interactions or laws; indeed, awareness of such complex systems provides another reason, besides the advent of quantum mechanical explanations of chemical phenomena noted in McLaughlin 992 , for the 'fall' of British Emergentism. That said, it remains a live if somewhat outside possibility that some complex phenomena involve new fundamental interactions, and (drawing on Wilson 2002 ) I identify a better, scienti cally supported criterion of the presence of a new fundamental interaction, in which a recognizable descendant of nonlinearity as indicative of strong metaphysical emergence is present in the form of seeming violations of conservation laws. In Section 2 I consider a representative variety of accounts of 'weak' emergence of the sort supposed to be compatible with physicalism (the idea being that weakly emergent entities are physically acceptable if their base entities are), which typically take as their starting point one or other variety of nonlinear system. Some such accounts-e.g. Newman's ( 996) account of features such as being in the basin of a strange attractor as identical, though inaccessibly so, to lower-level features-cannot be seen as characterizing emergence in other than merely epistemological terms. Others, including Bedau's ( 997, 2002) account of features such as being a glider gun in the Game of Life as explanatorily or algorithmically 'incompressible', and Batterman's ( 998) account of phase transitions as involving asymptotic universality, aim (or can be seen as aiming) to characterize emergence in genuinely metaphysical terms. As I argue, however, incompressibility and universality are compatible with the ontological reducibility of nonlinear systems and associated features; hence these criteria do not in themselves succeed in establishing that any nonlinear systems are even weakly emergent in a properly metaphysical sense.
In Section 3 I turn to an account of weak emergence that does successfully combine physical acceptability with ontological autonomy, based in the notion of degrees of freedom (DOF)-parameters needed to specify the states relevant to the law-governed properties and behaviour of a given entity or system. I rst motivate and summarize the key features of the DOF-based account (presented in detail in Wilson 20 0 ), according to which it su ces for a composite entity E 's being metaphysically weakly emergent from the system of its composing entities e i that E has DOF some of which are eliminated relative to the comparatively unconstrained system of e i . I then argue that various paradigmatic nonlinear systems are plausibly seen as having DOF some of which are eliminated relative to entities in their composing base system, hence as being weakly metaphysically emergent.
Nonlinearity and strong metaphysical emergence . Nonlinearity in the British Emergentist tradition
Mill (in 'On the Composition of Causes', 843/ 973) distinguished two types of e ects of joint or composite causes. 'Homopathic' e ects conform to 'the principle of composition of causes' in being (in some sense) mere sums of the e ects of the component causes when acting in relative isolation, as when the weight of two massy objects on a scale is the scalar sum of their individual weights, or when the joint operation of two forces conforms to vector addition in bringing an object to the same place it would have ended up, had the forces operated sequentially. 'Heteropathic' e ects, by way of contrast, violate the principle in not being mere sums in any clear sense. What is most crucial for Mill about this distinction is that the advent of heteropathic e ects is taken to be indicative of the operation of new laws. Mill says:
This di erence between the case in which the joint e ect of causes is the sum of their separate e ects, and the case in which it is heterogeneous to them; between laws which work together without alteration, and laws which, when called upon to work together, cease and give place to others; is one of the fundamental distinctions in nature. ( 843/ 973: 408-9) And he o ers chemical compounds and living bodies as entities that are capable of producing heteropathic e ects.
Mill did not use the term 'emergence' (evidently Lewes 875 first did so), and his discussion appears to target a diachronic notion of emergence rather than the broadly synchronic emergence typically at issue in debates over whether some 'higher-level' goings-on are properly seen as emergent from some 'lower-level' goings-on. But given the reciprocal connection between powers and e ects, it is straightforward to translate between the two approaches: to say that an e ect of a feature of a composite entity is non-additive, relative to e ects of features of the parts acting separately, is just to say that the higher-level feature has a power not had by the lower-level base features when in additive combination.
3 Mill himself moves seamlessly from talk of heteropathic e ects to talk of new properties of and laws governing entities capable of causing such e ects: [W] here the principle of Composition of Causes [ . . . ] fails [ . . . ] the concurrence of causes is such as to determine a change in the properties of the body generally, and render it subject to new laws, more or less dissimilar to those to which it conformed in its previous state. ( Mill 843 / 973: 435) Both Mill's reference to 'new laws' and his taking such cases to contrast with 'the extensive and important class of phenomena commonly called mechanical' indicate that Mill's appeal to non-additivity of e ects is aimed at identifying a criterion for a higherlevel feature's having a new fundamental power, enabling it (or its possessing 'body') to override the usual composition laws in the production of certain e ects. As McLaughlin ( 992 ) notes, 'Mill holds that collocations of agents can possess fundamental forcegiving properties' (65). Hence it is that Mill's conception is appropriately seen as a variety of 'strong' metaphysical emergence, of the sort that, were it to exist, would falsify physicalism ('mechanism').
Other British Emergentists followed Mill in characterizing strong metaphysical emergence in terms of nonlinearity, as involving violations of broadly additive composition laws, including Alexander ( 920 ), who characterized emergent properties as having powers to produce heteropathic e ects; Morgan ( 923 ), who contrasted resultant with emergent features as being 'additive and subtractive only '; and Broad ( 925 ) , who o ered scalar and vector addition as paradigms of the compositional principles whose violation was characteristic of emergence.
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As in Mill's case, these appeals to nonlinearity are best seen as attempts to provide substantive metaphysical criteria of the operation of new fundamental powers, forces, or laws that come into play only at certain complex levels of existence, as when Broad ( 925 ) says, '[T]he law connecting the properties of silver-chloride with those of silver and of chlorine and with the structure of the compound is, so far as we know, an unique and ultimate law' (64-5). As such, McLaughlin accurately characterizes British Emergentism as: [ . . . ] the doctrine that there are fundamental powers to in uence motion associated with types of structures of particles [ . . . ] In a framework of forces, the view implies that there are what we may call 'con gurational forces': fundamental forces that can be exerted only by certain types of con gurations of particles [ . . . ] . 5 ( 992: 52) .
Is nonlinearity a mark of fundamentality?
Were the British Emergentists right, or at least reasonable, to take nonlinearity as a mark of emergent fundamentality? In answering this question we need rst to address a clear 4 Lewes's ( 875) was an exception to this rule, in characterizing emergence as involving any failure of 'general mathematizability'. Lewes's characterization is faulty, however: since one can always construct a broadly mathematical function from base to higher-level features, such a characterization will rule out any features as being emergent. 5 McLaughlin goes on to note that some British Emergentists were suspicious of forces per se, and to claim that the thesis could be preserved just as a thesis about new fundamental powers. For reasons that I'll get to in Section .3, I think the appeal to forces/interactions is essential to making out the position, but nothing in this subsection turns on this speci c issue.
objection to the su ciency claim, arising from taking the contrasting understanding of linearity to require that every feature (or associated power, etc.) of a composite entity be a linear combination of intrinsic features (powers, etc.) of its composing entities, or as it is sometimes put, a linear combination of features of its composing entities when these are 'in relative isolation'. Consider, for example, the shape of a molecule composed of some atoms.
6 The molecule's shape (and associated powers, etc.) is clearly not the product of any new fundamental interactions; but on the other hand this shape is clearly not a function (linear or otherwise) of just the shapes of the atoms when in relative isolation, but also of the bonding relations between the atoms holding these at some distance from each other.
British Emergentists were aware of this concern, and the most sophisticated and careful of them-that is, Broad-included pairwise and other relatively non-complex relations between the composing entities (or states of a airs consisting of lower-level entities standing in relatively non-complex lower-level relations) as among the physically acceptable 'summands' apt to be combined in broadly additive or mereological fashion, and against which a given claim of emergent nonlinearity was to be assessed. Hence it was that Broad characterized 'pure mechanism' as involving broadly additive deducibility of all higher-level features from features of lower-level entities 'either individually or in pairwise combination', and couched his o cial formulation of emergence in terms of failures of in-principle deducibility of composite features from features of composing entities both 'in isolation' and 'in other wholes'. The notion of linearity in these construals clearly adverts to lower-level relational as well as intrinsic features of composing entities, hence can accommodate the physical acceptability of, e.g., the shape of a molecule, as a broadly additive combination of shapes associated with atoms in pairwise or other relatively non-complex combination. Note that the broadly linear deducibility here can help itself to vector addition of forces exerted by atoms standing in bonding relations.
Given an appropriately sophisticated understanding of the notion of linearity at issue, then, it was quite reasonable for the British Emergentists to take nonlinearity to be a mark of emergent fundamentality. To start, various paradigm cases of non-emergent features of composite entities are simple scalar sums of features of their composing entities, as when the mass of a composite entity is the sum of the masses of its composing entities. More generally and more importantly, at the time it was common to suppose that e ects ultimately involve the exertion of various fundamental forces, including gravity and electromagnetism, operating either singly or together. Moreover, as Mill's discussion makes especially clear, the combination of fundamental forces was taken to proceed in accord with linear composition laws-that is, by means of vector rather than scalar addition. As such, and again recalling the correspondence between powers and e ects, linearity looked to provide a general handle on when the features of composite entities did not involve or invoke any new fundamental powers, forces, or laws. Failures of features or behaviours of composite systems to be subject to linear analysis would thus have been reasonably interpreted as indicating that some additional fundamental force-a force not operative at lower, less complex levels of natural reality-was now on the scene.
Though reasonable at the time, the Emergentist supposition that nonlinearity is sufcient indication of strong metaphysical emergence is no longer plausible. For one thing, the picture of causal relations as constituted by the operation of additive combinations of fundamental push-pull forces is now seen as largely heuristic, or in any case not generalizable; it is fundamental interactions, involving particle exchanges, or yet more abstract accounts of the existence and evolution of natural phenomena, that provide the ultimate story as regards the 'go' of events, and to the extent that broadly Newtonian forces can be seen as real (as they arguably can be; see Wilson 2007 ), they are now assumed to be non-fundamental (as, e.g., constituted by fundamental interactions). For another, 20th-century investigations into a wide range of complex systems revealed not just that nonlinearity was rampant, but that in many of these cases the nonlinearity was generated simply as a result of complexity, without any need to posit additional fundamental interactions.
The recognition of many complex composite systems as genuinely nonlinear proceeded along several fronts. Even as early as the late s, there were di culties in seeing complex systems of the sort associated with turbulence in uids and gases, and phase transitions in general, as linear. Attempts were made to explain away failures of linear prediction in these cases as due to noise or imprecision in measurement; but in a nice recapitulation of the move from a Ptolemaic to a Copernican system of astronomy, the anomalies and epicycles associated with the supposition of linearity eventually gave way to an understanding of chaotic complex systems as having genuinely nonlinear dynamics. This is not to say, of course, that failures in prediction were thereby (always) overcome; rather, such failures were alternatively explained as re ecting, most saliently, the highly sensitive dependence of the associated nonlinear functions on initial conditions (a.k.a. 'the butter y e ect').
That the predictive anomolies in some complex systems could not generally be put down just to noise or imprecision was con rmed by attention to natural and arti cial nonlinear systems for which the relevant initial conditions could be speci ed with complete accuracy. Population growth, for example, is straightforwardly modelled by the nonlinear logistic map:
Here a is a parameter representing birth and death rates, and is di erent for di erent systems. The behaviour of a given system is strongly dependent on a . For most values of a , the system evolves to a xed point; as a approaches 4, the system's behaviour becomes periodic, and subject to increasingly rapid bifurcation; for a = 4, the system's behaviour becomes chaotic, with very small di erences in initial conditions x i , associated with distant decimal places, eventually leading to wildly di erent trajectories. The discovery of natural nonlinear systems encouraged attention to nonlinear systems in general, and with the advent of computers in the latter half of the 20th century much attention focused on arti cial complex systems such as cellular automata, where, as in Conway's 'Game of Life' (see Section 2.2 below), the stipulated dynamics are nonlinear.
What is the bearing of such genuinely nonlinear systems on the British Emergentist supposition that nonlinearity is su cient for strong metaphysical emergence? Most obviously, the su ciency claim is undermined, in that at least some cases of nonlinear complex systems-e.g. that associated with population growth or cellular automataclearly do not involve any additional fundamental forces/interactions, etc. (in the case of automata, as a matter of explicit stipulation).
More generally, it is often taken for granted that strong metaphysical emergence, of the sort, again, whose existence would falsify physicalism (mechanism), is not at issue in any cases of nonlinear systems along lines of those mentioned above. Hence Bedau says:
An innocent form of emergence-what I call 'weak emergence'-is now a commonplace in a thriving interdisciplinary nexus of scienti c activity [ . . . ] that includes connectionist modeling, non-linear dynamics (popularly known as 'chaos' theory), and arti cial life. ( Bedau 997 : 375) It is worth noting, however, that stated reasons for thinking that nonlinear systems in general are physically acceptable aren't good. Newman ( 996 ) cites the fact that complex systems are 'strictly deterministic' in support; but nothing prevents emergent features from entering, both as regards their emergence and their subsequent evolution, into a deterministic nomological net.
7 Nor does the fact that features of nonlinear systems are 'derivable' from nonlinear equations and initial (or boundary) conditions establish physical acceptability, since-as the British Emergentist tradition makes explicit-unlike linear combinations, that nonlinear combinations of physically acceptable features are themselves physically acceptable is not obvious. Bedau ( 997 ) claims that features of nonlinear systems are physically acceptable because 'structural'-that is: are features of a relational system consisting in composing entities standing in lower-level relations; but given that the features of such a relational entity do not consist solely in additive combinations of features of the parts, that such features are merely structural (as with, e.g., the shape of a molecule), in a sense that would entail physical acceptability, is again not obvious. One might aim to support the general claim via an argument by analogy, maintaining that insofar as various surprising features associated with nonlinearity (period doubling, extreme sensitivity to initial conditions) can be modelled in comparatively simple and arti cial systems for which no fundamental novelty is at issue, there is no reason to suppose that more complex natural nonlinear systems involve fundamental novelty, either. But this argument by analogy fails, for precisely what is at issue is whether, in the more complex natural cases, the nonlinearity at issue has a physically acceptable source.
Indeed, there is in-principle room for maintaining that strong metaphysical emergence is at issue in at least some cases of nonlinearity. Consider, for example, cases where the non-linear phenomena involves feedback between the micro-entities constituting the base, associated with strange attractors and other dynamic phenomena. As Silberstein and McGeever ( 999 ) note, non-linearity might be taken to involve a kind of system-level holism:
What is the causal story behind the dynamics of strange attractors, or behind dynamical autonomy? The answer, it seems to us, must be the non-linearity found in chaotic systems. Silberstein and McGeever go on to suggest that relational holism of this sort might re ect emergent features' possessing fundamentally new powers ('irreducible causal capacities'). It has also been suggested (or interpreted as being suggested) that the singularities standardly associated with thermodynamic phase transitions are indicative of strong emergence. Hence Callender and Menon (forthcoming) interpret Batterman's claim that 'thermodynamics is correct to characterize phase transitions as real physical discontinuities and it is correct to represent them mathematically as singularities' ( Batterman 2005 : 234) as signalling Batterman's commitment to phase transitions' being emergent along British Emergentist lines. Whether Teller and Batterman would agree that relational holism or thermodynamic singularities should be understood as involving new fundamental powers/interactions/laws is disputable (see in particular my upcoming discussion of Batterman's view). Still, for present purposes the crucial point is that one could maintain strong emergence as underlying some features associated with complex natural nonlinear systems.
Let's sum up the results so far. First, whether or not all nonlinear systems are physically acceptable, in any case there's no doubt that some are. The general moral to be drawn from the identi cation of straightforwardly mechanistic and arti cial nonlinear systems is that, contra Mill and the other British Emergentists, nonlinearity is not su cient indication of fundamental higherlevel powers/interactions/laws. This result represents a second salient reason for the fall of British Emergentism, besides the advent of quantum mechanical explanations of chemical phenomena noted in McLaughlin ( 992 ).
Second, though many nonlinear systems clearly do not involve strong metaphysical emergence, stated reasons for generalizing this result to all nonlinear systems do not go through, and the general claim, as it stands, appears to be something of an article of faith. It would be nice if, given that nonlinearity itself can no longer be seen as criterial of strong metaphysical emergence, there was an alternative criterion which could distinguish physically acceptable from physically unacceptable cases of nonlinearity (assuming any of the latter exist). I turn now to identifying such a criterion, as entering into a somewhat re ned account of strong metaphysical emergence.
.3 Nonlinearity's descendant
In Wilson ( 2002 ) I o ered an account of strong metaphysical emergence along British Emergentist lines, as explicitly (as opposed to implicitly, as on Broad's characterization in terms of 'in-principle failure of deducibility') involving a new fundamental force/ interaction. As above, at the heart of the Emergentist position is that an emergent composite system has features bestowing new powers, grounded in new fundamental forces or interactions, to produce e ects that the composing system can't enter into producing. 8 McLaughlin claimed (see note 3) that those suspicious of forces (and presumably also of interactions) could dispense with this aspect of the view, retaining only the appeal to new powers; but as I argued in my (2002), this claim is likely incorrect, for on a wide variety of accounts of which powers are bestowed by a given feature, the powers of features of a composite system are inherited by the features of the composing system, simply in virtue of the latter features' being nomologically necessary preconditions for the former. Without a more ne-grained way of assigning powers to features, the possibility of strong metaphysical emergence threatens to be ruled out of court-a bad result, since surely the truth of some version of physicalism is not that easy to establish. I considered various ways of getting around this problem-by appeal, e.g., to a distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' bestowing of a power, or by appeal to di erent systems of lawsbut concluded that the most straightforward and metaphysically illuminating solution to the problem proceeds by recognizing that powers are typically grounded in speci c fundamental forces/interactions, and incorporating this dependence into the operative account of strong metaphysical emergence.
That powers are grounded in distinct fundamental forces/interactions is, I take it, scienti cally uncontroversial. The power of being able to bond with an electron, in circumstances where one is in the vicinity of a free electron, is grounded in the electromagnetic (or electroweak) force/interaction, as opposed to the strong nuclear or gravitational forces/interactions. The power of being able to fall when dropped, in circumstances where one is poised above Earth's surface, is grounded in the gravitational force, as opposed to the other fundamental forces in operation. The power of being able to bond with other atomic nuclei in a stable con guration is grounded in the strong nuclear force/interaction, as opposed to the electromagnetic, weak, or gravitational forces/interactions. The power of being able to sit on a chair without falling through it is grounded (at least) in the gravitational and the electromagnetic forces/interactions. In grounding the powers bestowed by properties, fundamental forces/interactions explain, organize, and unify vast ranges of natural phenomena. More could and eventually should be said about the details of the grounding relation at issue, but for present purposes it will su ce to note that we appear to be within our rights to speak of a feature's bestowing (or not bestowing) a power, relative to a given set of fundamental interactions.
But are there philosophical problems with positing fundamental forces or interactionsin particular, should we be suspicious of such entities on metaphysical grounds? One thing to say here is that, as above, Newtonian forces, understood as pushes and pulls having magnitudes and directions, have been replaced in fundamental theorizing by fundamental interactions, involving particle and energy exchanges; as such, one might maintain that Newtonian forces are no longer directly relevant to the characterization of strong emergence. That said, the primary reason for rejecting Newtonian forcesnamely, that their posit is redundant, since the properties giving rise to the purported forces are su cient unto the task of explaining causal relations-might also be supposed to apply to fundamental interactions. It is thus worth noting that ways of responding to this concern about forces (set out in Wilson 2007 ) also serve to vindicate the posit of fundamental interactions. Fundamental interactions are thus both scienti c and metaphysical posits in good standing; hence it is reasonable to appeal to them in characterizing the strong emergence of broadly scienti c entities.
My suggestion, then, is that strong emergence (and also its 'complement', realization) should be understood as a relative notion-relative, that is, to a speci ed set of fundamental interactions { F }. Let us assume, as per usual, that every feature of a composite entity E is (at least) nomologically necessitated by a feature of the system of its composing entities e i .
9 Schematically expressed, the account is as follows:
Interaction-relative Strong Emergence : Feature P of composite entity E is strongly emergent from feature Q of the system of composing entities e i , relative to { F }, if (i) Q nomologically necessitates P , and (ii) P is associated with at least one power that is not identical with any power of Q that is grounded only in fundamental interactions in { F }.
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The British Emergentist's account of strong emergence is then accommodated by taking the fundamental interactions in {F} to be the fundamental physical interactionsthat is, those coming into play at or below the atomic level of organization. And British Emergentism would then be the thesis (contrasting with any version of physicalism), that at least one feature of at least one composite entity is strongly emergent in having at least one power that is not grounded only in fundamental physical interactions. 9 Recall that in my talk of a 'system' of composing entities I am remaining neutral between the one-one and one-many characterizations of the system; see note .
0 This account can be extended to apply to cases of non-composite emergence (e.g. emergence of melded 'fusions' as discussed in Humphreys 1997 ).
See Wilson 2005 for discussion of how to characterize the physical entities (including interactions) so as to avoid concerns stemming from 'Hempel's dilemma'.
As pre gured, Interaction-relative Strong Emergence makes room for there to be strong metaphysical emergence: even if, taking all fundamental interactions into account, features of the composing system inherit all the powers of any features they nomologically necessitate, it remains that composite features may be associated with powers that are relevantly 'new', in not being grounded only in the set of physical fundamental interactions.
Interaction-relative Strong Emergence also has three features relevant to investigating the mutual bearing of nonlinearity on strong emergence.
First, the account nicely accommodates the supposition that features of a composite entity that can be analysed as broadly additive combinations of physically acceptable features of the composing entities will not be strongly emergent. For whatever the precise account of how powers are grounded in fundamental interactions, in any case it is clear-to go back to Mill's original discussion-that every power of a feature that is a broadly additive combination of physically acceptable features will be grounded only in fundamental physical interactions, hence fail to be strongly emergent.
Second, the account suggests an alternative criterion for strong emergence, that not only survives the advent of physically acceptable nonlinear systems, but moreover provides the means of distinguishing, at least in principle, between cases of nonlinearity that do and cases that don't involve strong emergence. On the interaction-relative account, strong emergence explicitly involves the coming into play of a new fundamental interaction; hence in determining whether there is any such emergence we can adopt whatever scienti c methods are available for tracking such fundamental novelty. Here it is especially useful to attend to the discovery of the weak nuclear interaction, since this interaction occurs at a lower-level but still con gurational level. This discovery was motivated by its seeming to be that certain nuclear processes, involving alpha radiation in particular, violated well-entrenched conservation laws of mass-energy and momentum. Rather than reject the associated conservation laws, the books were balanced by positing an additional fundamental interaction. A similar strategy makes in-principle empirical room for testing whether or not the unusual features associated with complex natural nonlinear systems are due to con gurational fundamental interactions, by comparing the values of relevant conserved quantities predicted by fundamental physical theory as attaching to composite entities, with the actually observed values of these quantities. If there's less (or more) energy coming out than going in, for example, we might well be inclined to conclude, following accepted scienti c procedure and as per the strong emergentist thesis, that a new con gurational force/interaction is in operation.
Third, in the appeal to apparent violations of conservation laws as a su cient criterion of strong emergence, we have, it seems to me, a recognizable descendant of the British Emergentist appeal to apparent violations of linearity as such a criterion. For in both cases, the apparent violations serve to ag that the whole is more than the mere sum of its parts; and that additional fundamental entities must be posited, if the sum-of forces, of conserved quantities-is to come out right.
All this said, I take it that there is not much motivation for thinking that any complex natural nonlinear systems involve new fundamental interactions. Still, it is useful to observe, rst, that strong metaphysical emergence understood in interaction-relative terms is conceptually viable, and second, that (unlike bare appeals to relational holism or representational mismatch, whose status as criterial for new fundamental interactions is controversial) such an account suggests a criterion for strong emergence upon which all parties are likely to agree, and which could, in principle, be tested for.
2 Nonlinearity and weak metaphysical emergence I now want to turn to the role nonlinearity has played in a representative range of accounts of weak metaphysical emergence (of the sort, again, whose occurrence is supposed to be compatible with physicalism) intended to apply to three di erent kinds of nonlinear systems. As above, accounts of properly metaphysical emergence aim to combine the dependence of a composite system E on the system of its composing base entities e_i with E 's ontological (and also causal) autonomy from the composing e_i ; and in cases of weak emergence the autonomy is supposed to be compatible with the composite system and its features' being physically acceptable. But as I'll argue, (a representative range of ) accounts of weak emergence are compatible with the ontological (hence causal) reducibility of the nonlinear systems at issue, and hence establish, at best, that such systems are epistemologically or representationally emergent. I'll establish this, in turn, for Newman's account of emergence as a matter of epistemologically inaccessible identity between composite and base features, applied to properties such as being in the basin of a strange attractor ; Bedau's account of weak emergence as involving algorithmic or explanatory incompressibility, applied to properties such as being a glider gun in the Game of Life; and Batterman's account of emergence as involving asymptotic universality, as applied to thermodynamic systems undergoing phase transitions.
2 I'll then present my (20 0) account of weak metaphysical emergence as involving an elimination in degrees of freedom associated with the composite entity as compared to the unconstrained system of its composing base entities, and argue that at least some nonlinear systems are weakly emergent, by lights of the DOF-based account.
Newman's inaccessible-identity-based emergence
Newman's focus ( 996) is on chaotic nonlinear systems, characteristically exhibiting (among other interesting features) extreme sensitivity to initial conditions (as per the 'butter y e ect'). Such systems are, he notes, associated with 'strange attractors': 2 As we'll see, there's good reason to think that Batterman doesn't really have any sort of metaphysical account of emergence in mind. Still, asymptotic universality runs through his work and it is worth considering whether this (or the related notion of stability under permutation) could serve as a basis for weak metaphysical emergence. Another feature of the sort of systems Batterman discusses receives a thoroughly metaphysical treatment in my own account of weak emergence (Section 3).
A strange attractor is a non-periodic trajectory in the state space that exhibits sensitive dependence on initial conditions. This means that as the state of a chaotic system evolves toward the attractor in its state space, it will never be in exactly the same state twice, and any two nearby points in the state space will diverge exponentially under the dynamical evolution of the system. ( 996: 254) Typically, for certain parameters of a given non-linear dynamical equation, a system governed by the equation will evolve towards a strange attractor A in its state space, no matter what its initial state; such a system is said to be 'in the basin' of strange attractor A . So, for example, in the case of the logistic map, the onset of chaos occurs for a = 4.
Chaotic nonlinear systems exhibit two epistemological characteristics. First, due to the sensitive dependence on initial conditions we are unable to predict the future trajectory of a chaotic non-linear system: [F] or any chaotic system, since the measurements that we can make of its state are less than perfect [ . . . ] the future states of that system are impossible to predict. [ . . . ] The kind of unpredictability introduced by chaotic systems is a kind of epistemic impossibility rather than a metaphysical impossibility. ( Newman 996 : 254) Second, di culties in measurement also mean that it is epistemically 'impossible to determine exactly which chaotic system we are dealing with'. These characteristics enter into Newman's account of weak emergence, on which emergent features of composite systems are, while identical to some lower-level feature of the composing system, such that it is epistemically impossible to make the identi cation, as follows:
A property designated by a predicate P in an ideal theory T is emergent [from T'] if and only if the following conditions are met:
(i) T describes a class of systems which are structured aggregates of entities described by T'. (ii) T' is an ideal theory of those entities, and the entities described by T strongly supervene on those described by T' 3 (iii) Occurrences of the property designated by P are epistemically impossible to identify with occurrences of any property nitely describable in T' (iv) Each occurrence of the property designated by P is an occurrence of one of a set of properties PC, which is modelled by T'. Each member of PC is epistemically indistinguishable in T' from some other member of PC.
Newman argues that the property of being in the basin of a strange attractor is such an emergent property of nonlinear systems. Nonlinear chaotic systems (described by the relevant higher-level science T) are structured aggregates of lower-level physically acceptable entities (ultimately described by fundamental physical theory), as per (i); nonlinear chaotic systems, Newman assumes, strongly supervene on entities described in fundamental physical theory, as per (ii); moreover, every occurrence of a property of a chaotic nonlinear system is, Newman assumes, identical to the occurrence of a lowerlevel physically acceptable property, as per (iv); but given that occurrences of the higher-level property are so extremely sensitive to initial conditions, the precise values of which are epistemically inaccessible to us, we are never in position to specify the relevant identities, as per (iii). Newman's account is straightforwardly epistemological, and indeed in supposing that every property of a nonlinear dynamic system is identical with some lower-level physically acceptable property, he is clear that he thinks the former are ontologically, hence causally, reducible to the latter. I mention Newman's account as representative of perhaps the most common approach to the weak emergence of nonlinear systemsnamely, one on which the 'emergence' of such systems is cashed in terms of one or other epistemological feature commonly associated with such systems (see also Popper and Eccles 977 ; Klee 984 ; Rueger 200 ). However illuminating such accounts may be as regards why we nd the features and behaviour of such systems interesting, novel, or unpredictable, they go no distance towards establishing nonlinearity as a mark of weak metaphysical emergence. The accounts to be next considered aim (or can be seen as aiming) to do better.
Bedau's incompressibility-based emergence
Bedau's focus is on a feature of nonlinear systems shared by both chaotic and nonchaotic nonlinear systems; namely, that such systems typically fail to admit of analytic or 'closed' solutions. The absence of analytic or otherwise 'compressible' means of predicting the evolution of such systems means that the only way to nd out what this behaviour will be is by 'going through the motions': set up the system, let it roll, and see what happens. It is this feature-namely, algorithmic incompressibility -that serves as the basis for Bedau's account of weak emergence, as follows:
Where system S is composed of micro-level entities having associated micro-states, and where microdynamic D governs the time evolution of S's microstates:
Macrostate P of S with microdynamic D is weakly emergent i P can be derived from D and S's external conditions but only by simulation. ( 997: 378) Derivation of a system's macrostate 'by simulation' involves iterating the system's micro-dynamic, taking initial and any relevant external conditions as input. The broadly equivalent conception in Bedau's (2002) takes weak emergence to involve 'explanatory incompressibility', where there is no 'short-cut' explanation of certain features of a composite system. In being derivable by simulation from a micro-physical dynamic, associated macrostates are understood to be physically acceptable; as Bedau ( 997 ) says, such systems indicate 'that emergence is consistent with reasonable forms of materialism' (376).
By way of illustration, Bedau focuses on Conway's Game of Life, an example of a non-chaotic nonlinear map. The game consists in a set of simple rules, applied simultaneously and repeatedly to every cell in a lattice of 'live' and 'dead' cells. 4 Here there is no problem of sensitivity to initial conditions, since these conditions consist just in the discrete 'seeding' of the lattice. Still, Bedau argues that the property of being a glider gun in the Game of Life is weakly emergent, in his sense. That this property (involving a gun-like shape that moves across the grid, emitting 'bullets') does not involve any strong emergence is clear, since for cellular automata the long-term behaviour of the system is completely determined by ('derived from') the lower-level 'rules' applying to cells in the grid. But that a given system will evolve in such a way as to generate a glider gun can typically not be predicted from knowledge of initial conditions (seeding) and these rules.
On the face of it Bedau's account, like Newman's, does not characterize a genuinely metaphysical account of weak emergence, an impression seemingly con rmed when Bedau says that 'weakly emergent phenomena are autonomous in the sense that they can be derived only in a certain non-trivial way' ( Bedau 2002 : 6) . Indeed, Bedau is explicit that he takes weakly emergent features of composite systems to be both ontologically and causally reducible to features of their composing systems:
[W]eakly emergent phenomena are ontologically dependent on and reducible to micro phenomena. (2002: 6) [T]he macro is ontologically and causally reducible to the micro in principle. (2008: 445) Notwithstanding these reductive assumptions, Bedau maintains that the autonomy of weakly emergent entities on his account is not just epistemological, but also properly metaphysical. He o ers two reasons for thinking this, but as I'll now argue, neither establishes the claim.
The rst is that the incompressibility of an algorithm or explanation is an objective metaphysical (if broadly formal) fact:
The modal terms in this de nition are metaphysical, not epistemological. For P to be weakly emergent, what matters is that there is a derivation of P from D and S's external conditions and any such derivation is a simulation. [ . . . ] Underivability without simulation is a purely formal notion concerning the existence and nonexistence of certain kinds of derivations of macrostates from a system's underlying dynamic. ( 997: 379) But such facts about explanatory incompressibility, though objective and hence in some broad sense 'metaphysical', are not suited to ground the metaphysical autonomy of emergent entities. What is needed for such autonomy is not just some or other metaphysical distinction between macro-and micro-goings-on, but moreover one which plausibly serves as a basis for rendering weakly emergent features ontologically autonomous from-that is, distinct from-the lower-level features upon which they depend.
The second reason Bedau gives is somewhat more promising; namely, that weakly emergent features typically enter into macro-level patterns and laws. As Bedau says: [T] here is a clear sense in which the behaviors of weak emergent phenomena are autonomous with respect to the underlying processes. The sciences of complexity are discovering simple, general macro-level patterns and laws involving weak emergent phenomena. [ . . . ] In general, we can formulate and investigate the basic principles of weak emergent phenomena only by empirically observing them at the macro-level. In this sense, then, weakly emergent phenomena have an autonomous life at the macro-level. ( 997: 395) As such, Bedau maintains, 'weak emergence is not just in the mind; it is real and objective in nature ' ( 2008 : 444 ). Attention to macro-level patterns sounds like a move in the right direction towards autonomy; but, two points. First, I don't see how Bedau can maintain that some weakly emergent goings-on are not 'merely epistemological' ( Bedau 2008 : 45 ) and rather re ect an 'autonomous and irreducible macro-level ontology', while also maintaining that all weakly emergent goings-on are metaphysically ontologically and causally reducible to the micro-level goings-on. Either the metaphysical autonomy or the metaphysical reducibility has to go. Second, it isn't enough to block the potential reducibility of composite features to features of the composing base system, merely to point to the fact that the composite features enter into nomological patterns that are in some sense more general than those into which the composing features enter. To see this, it is useful to recall a related dialectic in the physicalism debates. There, would-be non-reductive physicalists point to the fact that mental features are associated with functional roles (i.e. 'macro-level patterns') that can be multiply implemented, or realized, by lower-level physical features; but the reductionist's ready response is that the existence of functional or other comparatively general patterns can be accommodated, on their terms, by identifying a given mental feature with (to cite the most salient candidates) a disjunction of its rst-order physical realizers or the second-order existential property of having one or other of its rst-order physical realizers. The dialectic sometimes continues, with the non-reductive physicalist rejecting, e.g., the existence of disjunctive features on grounds that they are too gerrymandered, are not projectible, or otherwise suspect; but such considerations seem, from a reductionist perspective, either unprincipled or uncompelling. Similarly, in the case of being a glider gun , while something seems right about attending to the comparative generality of the patterns into which this feature enters, more needs to be said if reductionist accommodation of such macro-level patterns is to be blocked in a principled and compelling fashion.
Bedau does not say more along these lines, however, and the upshot is that this strategy, like the previous, fails to establish that features of nonlinear systems are even weakly metaphysically emergent.
Batterman's asymptotic emergence
Batterman has in recent years written a great deal concerning the status as emergent or reducible of special science entities (see his 2002, 2005, and elsewhere); but perhaps because his discussions have tended to engage primarily with theoretical/representational and explanatory issues, there has remained unclarity as regards whether he takes emergence to be a metaphysical phenomenon, and if so, of what strength. As I'll discuss, there is good reason to think that Batterman does not have even a weak account of metaphysical emergence in mind (much less the strong account some attribute to him). Still, no discussion of emergence as relevant to nonlinear phenomena should neglect Batterman's work on emergence in asymptotic regions of the sort associated with phase transitions, since these share key features with chaotic nonlinear systems; and whatever Batterman's view of the matter, various features of systems in asymptotic regions are at least promising so far as indicating that weak metaphysical emergence is in place. I'll start, then, by discussing some general features of Batterman's account of emergence as associated with asymptotic limits, and the speci c application of his account to the case of systems undergoing phase transitions. I'll identify three related characteristics of such systems, each of which generally applies to chaotic nonlinear systems and might be thought promising as regards characterizing weak metaphysical emergence; namely, eliminations in micro-level degrees of freedom (DOF) , asymptotic universality , and stability under permutation . I'll say why it's fairly clear that Batterman does not see these features as tracking a genuinely metaphysical form of emergence. I'll then consider whether the latter two features, which are the primary running themes in Batterman's work (see his 998, 2000, 2002, 2005) , might nonetheless serve as su cient criteria for weak emergence, and I'll argue that they cannot do so, since here again the having of these features is compatible with ontological reducibility. In the next section I turn to my preferred, explicitly metaphysical DOF-based account of weak emergence, which, I'll argue, is up to the task of guaranteeing ontological autonomy.
Let's summarize the basics of Batterman's account of asymptotic emergence. 6 An asymptote in mathematics is a limiting value of a function that is approached inde nitely closely, but never reached. So, for example, as x→0 the function /x goes to in nity; in this case (though not all, of course) the asymptote is associated with a discontinuity. Interestingly, many 'near-neighbour' scienti c theories involve asymptotes: special relativity asymptotically approaches Newtonian mechanics in the limit as v/c→0, wave optics→ray optics as /λ approaches 0, (quantum mechanics) → Newtonian mechanics as Planck's constant→0, statistical mechanics→thermodynamics in the 'thermodynamic limit', where particle number N and volume V→in nity. Now, in some of these casesin particular, the latter three-the asymptotic limits at issue are associated with discontinuities in the regions near the asymptote. In such cases of 'singular' asymptotic limits, Batterman suggests, we have reason to take various objects or features associated with the asymptotic region (or associated theory) as emergent. In particular, to cut to the case which concerns us, Batterman suggests that various features of systems undergoing phase transitions, including those associated with certain critical exponents, are emergent features of such systems. Why so, and in what sense?
Batterman's most explicit stated considerations concern broadly explanatory factors. Again focusing on the case which concerns us, one explanatory concern re ects a kind of theoretical mismatch between the near-neighbour theories at issue, insofar as the discontinuities associated with taking the thermodynamic limit, and which are commonly supposed to be needed to accommodate the associated asymptotic phenomena, nd no representational mirror in the analytic functions of statistical-mechanics. 7 Even if there were no problem with deriving speci c instances of asymptotic features from the micro-theory, however, Batterman's second explanatory concern would remain; namely, that the characteristic universality of asymptotic phenomena cannot be properly explained by reference just to lower-level 'causal-mechanical' explanations. As above, the behaviour of systems undergoing phase transitions is characterized by a small set of dimensionless numbers called 'critical exponents'. As Batterman ( 998 ) says:
Lower-level causal-mechanical explanations, even if available, cannot account for universality, for these 'will be in nitely various in detail and this will block any reconstruction of what is universal about them ' (2004: 442) .
By way of contrast, Batterman argues, various methods for modelling asymptotic phenomena-most notably, the Renormalization Group (RG) method-do provide an explanation of the universal features of systems undergoing phase transitions. The applicability here primarily re ects that near critical points, the systems at issue cease to have any characteristic length scale, and are 'self-similar' in that the laws governing the systems take the same form at all length scales. Accordingly, the RG method-which takes a system's governing laws (e.g. its Hamiltonian) and iteratively transforms these into laws having a similar form but (reflecting moves to increasingly 'larger' scales) fewer parameters-can be applied. In the limit, the resulting Hamiltonian describes the behaviour of a single 'block', corresponding to the macroscopic system. As Batterman ( 998 ) puts it:
One introduces a transformation on this space that maps an initial physical Hamiltonian describing a real system to another Hamiltonian in the space. The transformation preserves, to some extent, the form of the original physical Hamiltonian so that when the interaction terms are properly adjusted (renormalized), the new renormalized Hamiltonian describes a system exhibiting the same or similar thermodynamical behavior. Most importantly, however, the transformation e ects a reduction in the number of coupled components or degrees of freedom within the correlation length. Thus, the new renormalized Hamiltonian describes a system which presents a more tractable problem. It is to be hoped that by repeated application of this renormalization group transformation the problem becomes more and more tractable until one can solve the problem by relatively simple methods. In e ect, the renormalization group transformation eliminates those degrees of freedom (those microscopic details) which are inessential or irrelevant for characterizing the system's dominant behavior at criticality. ( 998: 200) (I quote this and the next passage at length, in order to make explicit, for future purposes, Batterman's appeal to certain features potentially relevant to emergence.) In particular, application of the RG method in this case enables calculation of the critical exponents associated with phase transitions, and hence provides an explanation of the universal behaviour of systems near critical points:
[I]f the initial Hamiltonian describes a system at criticality, then each renormalized Hamiltonian must also be at criticality. The sequence of Hamiltonians thus generated de nes a trajectory in the abstract space that, in the limit as the number of transformations goes to in nity, ends at a xed point. The behavior of trajectories in the neighborhood of the xed point can be determined by an analysis of the stability properties of the xed point. This analysis also allows for the calculation of the critical exponents characterizing the critical behavior of the system. It turns out that di erent physical Hamiltonians can ow to the same xed point. Thus, their critical behaviors are characterized by the same critical exponents. This is the essence of the explanation for the universality of critical behavior: Hamiltonians describing di erent physical systems fall into the basin of attraction of the same renormalization group xed point. This means that if one were to alter, even quite considerably, some of the basic features of a system (say from those of a uid F to a uid F' composed of a di erent kind of molecule and a di erent interaction potential), the resulting system (F') will exhibit the same critical behavior. This stability under perturbation demonstrates that certain facts about the microconstituents of the systems are individually largely irrelevant for the systems' behaviors at criticality. ( 998: 20 ) Batterman's account of asymptotic emergence, especially as relevant to phase transitions, looks very promising, so far as vindicating the emergence of nonlinear systems is concerned. To start, there are three features associated with this account having at least prima facie promise for characterizing a form of weak metaphysical emergence, in particular: ( ) elimination of micro-level degrees of freedom (DOF); (2) universality of certain features or behaviour; (3) stability of certain behaviour under perturbation.
Moreover, these common features of systems undergoing phase transitions are more generally features of chaotic nonlinear systems, as Hooker ( 2004 ) implies:
In every case of so-called 'critical phenomena', e.g. near the 'critical point' beyond which there is no vapour phase between liquid and gas, the asymptotic domain shows a universally selfsimilar spectrum of uctuations. [ . . . ] This is indicative of chaos and occurs when behaviours are super-complexly, but still systematically, interrelated [ . . . ]. (2004: 440) Indeed, the core similarities between critical phenomena in statistical mechanics and chaotic nonlinear phenomena, including period doubling and intermittency routes to chaos of the sort displayed by the logistic map, have led to an active area of investigation in which 'the logistic map is I think Morrison's reading is correct, 8 but one might wonder if it is undermined by Batterman's seeming to suggest, especially in some passages in his (2002) book, that he sees metaphysical emergence as following from explanatory emergence, as when he says, 'It seems reasonable to consider these asymptotically emergent structures [as constituting] the ontology of an explanatory "theory"' ( Batterman 2002 : 96) . For another example, in discussing the asymptotic domain between wave and ray optics, Batterman rst argues that rainbows cannot be explained without referring to 'caustics'-ray tangent curves associated with the higher-level, but not lower-level theory, then suggests that we are ontologically committed to such optical objects:
[I]f I'm right and there is a genuine, distinct, third theory (catastrophe optics) of the asymptotic borderland between wave and ray theories-a theory that of necessity makes reference to both ray theoretic and wave theoretic structures in characterising its 'ontology'-then, since it is this ontology that we take to be emergent, those phenomena are not predictable from the wave theory. They are 'contained' in the wave theory but aren't predictable from it. (2002: 9) These suggestive passages are misleading, however, since Batterman has explicitly denied that the emergence at issue here carries ontological weight:
I do not believe that there is any new ontology in the asymptotic catastrophe optics. The wave theory has replaced the ray theory and there simply are no caustics (as characterized by the ray theory). Asymptotic analysis of the wave equation yields terms (think syntax here) which require for their interpretation (semantics) that we make reference to ray theoretic structures. In e ect, it is the understanding/interpretation of these terms in the asymptotic expansions that requires 'appeal' or reference to structures that 'exist' only in the ray theory. (p.c. with Hooker, discussed in Hooker 2004 : 448) Hooker concludes that 'the status claimed for caustics based on essential reference is not after all that of ontological commitment but one of ineliminable semantic role, without ontological commitment ' (2004: 448) . Similar remarks would presumably go for the 'emergent' phenomena at issue in phase transitions or chaotic nonlinear systems, more generally. Strictly speaking, Batterman's account of asymptotic emergence is an account of theoretical/representational or epistemological, not metaphysical, emergence.
That said, nothing prevents the more metaphysically inclined from considering whether any of the aforementioned features-elimination in micro-level DOF, universality, and/or stability under perturbation-might serve as su cient indicators of metaphysical emergence. With an eye to sticking somewhat closely to Batterman's work, we might look especially to the latter two features, since these features have been consistent themes in his work, which he has discussed as attaching to a variety of special science entities to which the RG approach and its associated strategy for eliminating DOF does not apply.
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Universality and stability under perturbations are really two sides of the same coin; as Batterman says, 'most broadly construed, universality concerns similarities in the behavior of diverse systems ' (2000: 20) . The suggestion that weak emergence might be a matter of universality or of stability under micro-level perturbations is common enough; indeed, we have already seen a version of this claim in Bedau's suggestion that the fact that certain features of nonlinear automata (e.g. glider guns) enter into 'macro-level patterns' might support such features' being metaphysically autonomous. It is unsurprising, then, that the same concerns with Bedau's suggestion, which again echo the debate over the import of multiple realizability in the metaphysics of mind, also attach to attempts to locate metaphysical emergence in universal or stable features of composite entities; namely, that reductionists have various strategies for accommodating such features, and that the standard anti-reductivist responses (rejecting disjunctive properties, denying that these track genuine natural kinds, and the like) are not compelling. What is needed, if these features are to be seen as tracking the ontological autonomy (distinctness) of composite entities, is a better response to the usual reductivist strategies; but Batterman does not provide such a response-arguably because his concern is ultimately with whether an appropriately explanatory account of universal or multiply realized features is available, and not with whether such features are (or are not) ontologically reducible.
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Let's sum up the results of this section. I've considered a representative survey of accounts of weak, or physically acceptable, emergence intended to apply to nonlinear systems of one or the other variety, but in each case the occurrence of the feature at issue (epistemic indiscernibility, algorithmic or explanatory incompressibility, presence in a macro-pattern, universality or stability under perturbation) has turned out to be, at least for all that proponents of these accounts have shown, compatible with ontological reduction of the systems at issue. So far, then, it has not been established that any nonlinear systems are even weakly metaphysically emergent. I turn now to considering the somewhat better prospects, as regards both viability and potential application to nonlinear systems is concerned, of weak emergence understood as involving an elimination in degrees of freedom (DOF).
Nonlinearity and eliminations in DOF
In Wilson ( 20 0 ) I proposed an account of weak emergence on which weakly emergent systems are both physically acceptable and ontologically autonomous from (that is, distinct from) the systems from which they emerge.
2 In this section I'll motivate and present this account, discuss how it accommodates both physical acceptability and autonomy, then argue that chaotic nonlinear systems satisfy the conditions of the account, hence are weakly metaphysically emergent.
A DOF-based account of weak metaphysical emergence
My account is based in the notion of a degree of freedom (DOF). Call states upon which the law-governed (i.e. nomologically possible) properties and behaviour of an entity E functionally depend the 'characteristic states' of E . A DOF is then, roughly, a parameter in a minimal set needed to describe an entity as being in a characteristic state. Given an entity and characteristic state, the associated DOF are relativized to choice of coordinates, re ecting that di erent sets of parameters may be used to describe an entity as being in the state. 22 More precisely, the operative notion of DOF is as follows:
Degrees of Freedom (DOF): For an entity E , characteristic state S , and set of coordinates C , the associated DOF are parameters in a minimal set, expressed in coordinates C , needed to characterize E as being in S .
I'll sometimes speak for short of 'characterizing an entity', with state and coordinates assumed. Some common characteristic states, and DOF needed to characterize certain systems as being in those states, are as follows:
The con guration state : tracks position. Specifying this state for a free point particle requires three parameters (e.g. x , y , and z ; or r , ρ , and θ ); hence a free point particle has con guration DOF, and a system of N free point particles has 3 N con guration DOF.
The kinematic state : tracks velocities (or momenta). Specifying this state for a free point particle requires six parameters: one for each con guration coordinate, and one for the velocity along that coordinate; hence a free point particle has kinematic DOF, and a system of N free point particles has 6 N kinematic DOF.
The dynamic state : tracks energies determining the motion. Specifying this state typically requires at least one dynamic DOF per con guration coordinate, tracking the kinetic energy associated with that coordinate; other dynamic DOF may track internal/external contributions to the potential energy.
Why attend to DOF in thinking about emergence? To start, as above, di erent systems, treated by di erent sciences, may be functionally dependent on the same characteristic state (e.g. the con guration state). Moreover, as above, the DOF needed to characterize intuitively di erent systems as being in these states typically vary. Following these observations, I take the main cash value of attention to DOF to lie in the fact that DOF track the details of a system's functional dependence on a given characteristic state in a more ne-grained way than the mere fact that the system is in the state does. Driving my account is the idea that the ne-grained details concerning functional dependence that are encoded in the DOF needed to characterize a given entity/system serve as a plausible ontological basis for the individuation of broadly scienti c entities/systems. I start by observing an important tripartite distinction (again, see Wilson 20 0 ) relevant to such functional dependence, re ecting that the DOF needed to characterize an entity may be reduced , restricted , or eliminated in certain circumstances (typically associated with the imposition of certain constraints or more generally, the presence of certain energetic interactions), compared to those needed to characterize a (possibly distinct) entity, when such circumstances are not in place. To pre gure: eliminations in DOF, in particular, will enter into the upcoming account of weak metaphysical emergence. Let's get acquainted with these di erent relations and note an example of each.
First, constraints may reduce the DOF needed to characterize an entity as being in a given state. So, for example, a point particle constrained to move in a plane has 2 conguration DOF, rather than the 3 con guration DOF needed to characterize a free point particle. In cases where a given DOF is given a xed value, the laws governing an entity so constrained are still functionally dependent on the (now constant) value of the DOF; hence such constraints do not eliminate the DOF, but rather reduce it to a constant value. By way of example: rigid bodies treated in classical mechanics have such a reduced set of DOF relative to the unconstrained system of their composing entities.
Second, constraints may also restrict DOF needed to characterize an entity. A point particle may be constrained, not to the plane, but to some region including and above the plane. Characterizing such a particle still requires 3 con guration DOF, but the values of one of these DOF will be restricted to only certain of the values needed to characterize the unconstrained particle. Cases of restriction in DOF are more like cases of reduction than elimination of DOF, in that, again, the entity's governing laws remain functionally dependent on speci c values of the DOF. By way of example: molecules, whose bonds are like springs, have a restricted set of DOF relative to the unconstrained system of their composing entities.
Third, sometimes the imposition of constraints eliminates DOF. So, for example, N free point particles, having 3 N con guration DOF, might come to compose an entity whose properties and behaviour can be characterized using fewer con guration DOF, not because certain of the DOF needed to characterize the unconstrained system are given a xed value, but because the properties and behaviour of the composed entity are functionally independent of these DOF. By way of example: a spherical conductor of the sort treated in electrostatics has DOF that are eliminated relative to the system of its composing entities, since while the E-eld due to free particles depends on all charged particles, the E-eld due to the spherical conductor depends only on the charges of particles on its surface. Certain quantum DOF are also eliminated in the classical (macroscopic) limit. So, for example, spin is a DOF of quantum entities; entities of the sort treated by classical mechanics are ultimately composed of quantum entities; but the characteristic states of composed classical-mechanical entities do not functionally depend on the spins of their quantum components.
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Two features of the illustrative special science case studies are important for what follows. First is that the holding of the constraints relevant to reducing, restricting, or eliminating DOF occurs as a matter entirely of physical or physically acceptable processes. Such processes su ce to explain why su ciently proximate atoms form certain atomic bonds, why atoms or molecules engage in the energetic interactions associated with SM ensembles, and so on. More generally, for each of the aforementioned special science entities E , the constraints on the e i associated with their composing E are explicable using resources of the theory treating the e i (or resources of some more fundamental theory, treating the constituents of the e i ). Call such constraints ' e i -level constraints'. A second important feature of these special science entities E is that all of their properties and behaviour are completely determined by the properties and behaviour of their composing e i , when these stand in the relations relevant to their composing E .
24 People disagree about the metaphysical ground for this determination, but all parties agree that the determination is in place.
These preliminaries in hand, the DOF-based account of weak metaphysical emergence is as follows:
DOF-based weak metaphysical emergence : An entity E is weakly metaphysically emergent from some entities e i if:
( ) E is composed by the e i , as a result of imposing some constraint(s) on the e i .
(2) For some characteristic state S of E : at least one of the DOF required to characterize the system of unconstrained e i as being in S is eliminated from the DOF required to characterize E as being in S . (3) For every characteristic state S of E : every reduction, restriction, or elimination in the DOF needed to characterize E as being in S is associated with e i -level constraints. (4) The law-governed features of E are completely determined by the law-governed features of the e i , when the e i stand in the relations relevant to their composing E.
Systems that are emergent by lights of the above account are physically acceptable, given that the unconstrained system of composing entities is physically acceptable. In my (20 0) I argue for this, but due to considerations of space, here I'll just observe that this result is to be expected, given that the constraints relevant to composing a weakly emergent entity E , as well as all of E 's law-governed features, are physically acceptable. I also argue in my (20 0) that entities satisfying DOF-based weak metaphysical emergence plausibly satisfy Non-reduction . Since the possibility of ontologically irreducibility is, as above, the main sticking point so far as accounts of weak metaphysical emergence is concerned, it's important to present this for the reader's perusal; but in order to keep the presentation owing, I've put my main argument for this claim in an appendix to this paper (in Section 4). In brief: the argument is an argument by cases, where I consider each of the lower-level entities that are candidates for being identical with a weakly emergent composite entity E ; for each case I show that the candidate reductive base entity has as many DOF as the unconstrained system of E 's composing entities, and so (given that E is weakly emergent, and so has strictly fewer DOF than the unconstrained system) cannot, by Leibniz's Law, be identical with E . Unlike all other accounts of weak emergence on the market, a DOF-based account provides the basis for an argument that a weakly emergent entity is ontologically autonomous from-that is, distinct from-the system of composing entities upon which the weakly emergent entity depends.
DOF-based weak emergence and chaotic nonlinear systems
Let's return now to cases of nonlinear systems, and consider whether they can be understood as weakly metaphysically emergent. Given Batterman's work on the Renormalization Group (RG) method, and my results concerning the su ciency of eliminations of DOF (along with certain other suppositions which are here in place, concerning e i constraints and e i determination), we can be comparatively brief.
As previously noted, the RG method applies to systems undergoing phase transitions, which are relevantly similar to and indeed can be understood as chaotic nonlinear systems; and that the RG applies to a given system provides as good indication as we are likely to get that the system has DOF that are not just reduced or restricted, but eliminated as compared to the unconstrained system of its composing entities (that is, as compared to the system of composing entities when not energetically interacting in the way associated with phase transitions, or more generally, with chaotic behaviour). We can thus argue as follows: As con rmation of the fact that chaotic nonlinear systems have eliminated DOF, it is worth noting that one of the puzzles that Batterman raises for thermodynamic systems carries over to nonlinear chaotic systems, and is answered in just the same way. The puzzle he raises concerns how thermodynamic systems can be a viable object of study. Such systems-e.g. an isolated gas E -are composed of massively large numbers of particles or molecules e i . Since the composite entity E in this case is (boundary restrictions aside) e ectively unstructured, shouldn't it have the same DOF as the system of unconstrained e i ? Supposing so, however, the success of SM is mysterious, since obviously we can't track ~ 0 26 DOF. As Batterman ( 998 ) puts it:
One wants to know why the method of equilibrium SM-the Gibbs' phase averaging method is so broadly applicable; why, that is, do systems governed by completely di erent forces and composed of completely di erent types of molecules succumb to the same method for the calculation of their equilibrium properties? ( 998: 85) The answer re ects that while the e i are not bonded, they are interacting via exchanges of energy, and such interactions may not only restrict or reduce, but eliminate DOF, which is indicated by the fact that the renormalization group method is appropriately applied to such systems. This, then, is the answer to the puzzle: such systems are tractable since the modes of interaction of their composing entities result in their having DOF that are massively eliminated compared to the unconstrained system of composing entities. Again:
[T]he renormalization group transformation eliminates those degrees of freedom (those microscopic details) which are inessential or irrelevant for characterizing the system's dominant behavior at criticality. ( 998: 200) A similar puzzle applies to chaotic nonlinear systems. Recall that chaotic nonlinear systems are characterized by their extreme sensitivity to initial conditions. If nonlinear systems are so sensitive and their resulting trajectories so 'chaotic', how is it that they can be, as they are, a viable object of scienti c study? The answer, I take it, is e ectively the same: the composing entities, though not bonded, are energetically interacting, in ways that, as application of the RG method reveals, massively eliminate the DOF needed to characterize the composite system. Here we have a solution to the puzzle, and more to the present point, a decisive, empirically supported case for taking the important class of chaotic nonlinear systems to be weakly metaphysically emergent.
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4 Appendix: the irreducibility of weakly emergent entities
The main objection to the claim that an entity can be both physically acceptable and metaphysically irreducible is the objection from theoretical deducibility, as follows. To start, laws governing weakly metaphysically emergent entities are (I am granting) deducible consequences of the laws of the more fundamental theory. But in that case, the objector asks, why doesn't such deducibility indicate that weakly metaphysically emergent entities E are ontologically reducible to their composing e_i ? Indeed, that theoretical deducibility entails ontological reducibility seems initially plausible, and has been commonly endorsed ( Nagel 96 ; Klee 984 ).
The concern can also be presented as a dilemma. As above, the constraints entering into the composition of our target special science entities are plausibly e i -level constraints, and as indicated, this feature is crucial to establishing the physical acceptability of the target entities. But if the constraints are e i -level, why can't the associated e i -level relations enter, one way or another, into an ontological as well as a theoretical reduction of E to its composing e i ? This line of thought is, I think, at the heart of suspicions that there is no way for entities to be weakly metaphysically emergent.
To see how attention to DOF provides a way of avoiding the dilemma, let's rst get clear on what would count as an ontological reduction of E to the e i . Traditionally and reasonably, the candidate reducing entities include all the lower-level entities, properties and relations, plus any ontologically 'lightweight' constructions-lower-level relational, Boolean (conjunctive or disjunctive), or mereological-out of these. Hence if E is to be ontologically reducible to the e i , then E must be identical to either: (i) a system consisting of the jointly existing e i ; (ii) a relational entity consisting of the e i standing in e i -level relations; or (iii) a relational entity consisting in a Boolean or mereological combination of the entities at issue in (i) and (ii).
Since E is weakly metaphysically emergent, there is some state S such that characterizing E as being in this state requires fewer DOF than are required to characterize the unconstrained system of E 's composing e i as being in S . Hence a necessary condition on E 's being identical with an entity of the type of (i)-(iii) is that the DOF required to characterize the candidate reducing entity as being in S are similarly eliminated, relative to the unconstrained system. I'll now argue that this condition isn't met for any of the entities of type (i)-(iii). First, consider the e i understood as (merely) jointly existing, as per (i). Such a system of e i is not subject to any constraints; hence for any state, characterizing this system will require the same DOF as are required to characterize the system of unconstrained e i .
So E is not identical to the system consisting of (merely) jointly existing e i . Second, consider the relational entity e r consisting of the e i standing in certain e i -level relations, as per (ii). Though e r realizes a constrained entity (namely, E ), e r is not itself appropriately seen as constrained-even throwing the holding of the constraints into the mix of e i -level relations at issue in e r . Why not? Because the laws governing entities (such as e r ) consisting of the e i standing in e i -level relations are, unlike the laws governing E , compatible with the constraints not being in place. Hence characterizing e r as entering into these laws, hence as capable of evolving into states (of, perhaps other e i level entities) where the constraints are not in place, requires all the DOF associated with the unconstrained system of e i . So E is not identical to e r .
Third, consider a Boolean (disjunctive or conjunctive) or mereological combination of entities of the previous varieties (or the closure of any such entity). To start, consider a relational entity consisting in a disjunctive combination of entities of the sort at issue in (i) or (ii). The occurrence of a disjunctive entity consists in one of its disjunct entity's occurring. Hence for any state, characterizing a disjunctive entity as being in that state will require all the DOF required to characterize any of its disjunct entities as being in that state. Such disjunct entities, being of type (i) or (ii), will require all the DOF required to characterize the system of unconstrained e i , for any state. So characterizing a disjunctive relational entity will require all the DOF required to characterize the system of unconstrained e i , for any state. The same goes for conjunctive entities. So E isn't identical to a disjunctive or conjunctive relational entity. Finally, consider a relational entity consisting in a mereological combination of entities of the sort at issue in (i) or (ii). Mereological wholes are identi ed with the mere joint holding of their parts; hence characterizing the whole will require all the DOF required to characterize each of the parts. Such parts, being of type (i) or (ii), will require all the DOF required to characterize the system of unconstrained e i , for any state. So characterizing a mereological relational entity will require all the DOF required to characterize the system of unconstrained e i , for any state. So E isn't identical to a mereological relational entity.
That exhausts the available candidates to which weakly metaphysically emergent entities might be ontologically reduced. In each case a weakly emergent entity has fewer DOF than the candidate reducing entity, so by Leibniz's Law the former is not identical to the latter. Attention to the metaphysical implications of the eliminations of DOF at issue in weak metaphysical emergence indicates that theoretical deducibility is compatible with ontological irreducibility. So physical acceptability is compatible with ontological autonomy, as weak metaphysical emergence supposes.
